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EMPLOYMENT LAW

Whose interpretationof OccupationalHealth
and Safety regulationsis entitled to deference?
by Jay F,. Grenig

Elizabeth H. Dole, Secretary of Labor,
U.S. Department of Labor
V.
Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission and CF&I Steel Corporation
(Docket No. 89-1541)
Argument Date: Vot,. 27, 1990

ISSUE
In this case the Supreme Court is asked to determine
whether the interpretation of a Department of Labor regulation by the Secretary of Labor, or the interpretation of
the regulation by the Occupational Safety and I lealth Review Commission, is entitled to deference where the two
interpretations conflict.
FACTS
In 1976 the Secretary of Labor determined that coke
oven emissions are carcinogenic. The Secretary then
promulgated a standard governing occupational exposure
to coke oven emissions. (41 Fed. Reg. 46,472-46,790
(1976).) The standard requ,ires that in "regulated areas" an
employee's exposure to coke oven emissions be limited
to a specified level. The standard permits the use of respirators when controls are not yet sufficient to reduce exposure to the permissible limit.
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029(g)(3) requires an employer to "institute a respiratory protection program in accordance with
§ 1910.134 of this part." 29 C.E.R. § 1910.134(e)(5) provides
that respirator users must "be properly instructed in its
selection, use and maintenance." It further states that
"[tiraining shall provide the men an opportunity to handie the respirator, have it fitted properly, test its face-pieceto-face seal, wear it in normal air for a long familiarity
period, and finally to wear it in a test atmosphere."
In August 1979 tile Secretary inspected CF&I Steel Corporation's coke oven facility in Pueblo, Colo. The inspection disclosed that CF&I had conducted two kinds of
respirator tests with its employees. The first test was a
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"positive/negative pressure test" in which a worker places
the respirator on his face, inhales or exhales, and checks
for leakage along the respirator seal. The second was a "banana oil" test in which a worker is exposed to isoamyl acetate ("banana oil") in order to determine whether he or
she can detect the odor of the chemical despite the respirator. The Secretary discovered that, during the administration of the banana oil test, 28 CF&I's employees had
detected banana oil. The Secretary also determined that
CF&I had failed to furnish the employees with different
respirators.
The Secretary issued a citation for a willful violation and
proposed the maximum penalty of $10,000. The Secretary
cited CF&I
only for a violation of 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1029(g)(3) and of the general standard on respiratory
protection incorporated in that section (i.e., 29 C.I1R. §
1910.134). The citation charged CF&I with failing to "institute a respiratory protection program in accordance with
§ 1910.134" in that respiratory training did not provide the
employees an opportunity to have their respirators fitted
properly and to test their face-piece-to-face-seal.
The Secretary maintained that § 1910.1029(g)(3), which
incorporates § 1910.134(e), requ,ires employers to provide
a different type or size respirator, if an employee's equipment fails the test. CF&I contested the citation, on the
ground that it had not violated § 1910.1029(g)(3). CF&I contended that § 1910.1029(g)(3) does not require an employer
to assure proper fit of a respirator.
Finding that 28 employees had failed their respirator fit
test and were not provided with respirators that Would fit,
an Occupational Safety and lealth Review Commission
("Commission") administrative law judge issued an opinion upholding the citation.
Five years later, in September 1986, the Commission
reversed the administrative law judge's decision in a 2-1
decision. The Commission concluded that § 1910.134 only
requires "the employer to instruct employees during training in such things as how to select a respirator, how to put
on a respirator, how to achieve a proper fit and how to
obtain a face-piece seal," and to give employees the opportunity to wear respirators in a test atmosphere during
training. The Commission determined that the Secretary's
interpretation of Section 1910.134 w'ould eliminate the purposc and meaning of Section 1910.1029(g)(.i)(i), which specifically covers an employer's duty to assure proper fit of
a respirator.
Because CF&I's employees had received instruction and
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an opportunity to wear respirators in a test atmosphere,
the Commission concluded that the requirements of Section 1910.134 had been met. According to the Commission,
"Itlhe fact that some employees detected the banana oil
while in the test atmosphere does not establish by itself
that the instructions or training otherwise provided were
inadequate."
The Secretary petitioned for judicial review of the Commission's decision. In December 1989, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied the petition and upheld the Commission's determination. 891 F.2d 1495 (10th
Cir. 1989).
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE

In 1970 Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and
Ilealth Act (the OSII Act). The legislation was intended "to
assure so far as possible... safe and healthful working conditions for every working man and woman in the Nation."
An employer has a duty under the OSII Act to "furnish
to each of his employees employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm to his employees."
The OSI IAct charges the Secretary of Labor with a broad
range of regulatory and enforcement responsibilities, including the setting of mandatory occupational safety and
health standards applicable to businesses affecting interstate commerce. The Secretary is also charged with enforcing the Act and undertaking various enforcement activities,
including issuing citations to employers determined to have
violated the OSII Act, proposing civil penalties against cited
employers, prescribing abatement periods for cited health
and safety violations, and seeking injunctive relief.
Congress created the Occupational Safety and I lealth Review Commission to adjudicate challenges to the Secretary's citations. The Commission consists of three
members, appointed by the president and confirmed by
the Senate. The Chairman of the Commission has the
authority to hire administrative law judges to assist the
Commission in the performance of its functions.
An employer may contest the Secretary's citation or notice of penalty before the Commission. When a citation
or penalty is contested, the Commission must afford an
opportunity for a hearing. Following the hearing, the Commission issues an order based on findings of fact, affirming, modifying, or vacating the Secretary's citation or
proposed penalty. The Commission's decision may be
reviewed by the courts. If the Commission affirms a citation, or if no challenge to a citation is filed, only the Secretary may seek enforcement of the citation in a court of
appeals.
1lere, the court is asked to determine whether deference
should be given to interpretations of the OSII Act regulations by the policymaker (the Secretary of L.abor) or by
the adjudicator (the Commission).
In appropriate circumstances, courts defer to an adminisIssue No. ,4

trative agency's reasonable interpretation of the agency's
regulations. This judicial deference to administrative interpretation of a regulation recognizes that, by administering a statutory regime on a day-to-day basis, the
administrative agency gains expertise from its experience
and should be accorded interpretive discretion to discharge its duty.
Any deference owed to an agency's interpretation of a
regulatory standard is owed only to the reasonable interpretation of the agency, If the Court holds that the Secretary's interpretation of the regulatory standard was
unreasonable, it may avoid determining whether a court
should defer to either the Secretary or the Commission's
interpretation.
ARGUMENTS
For the United States Secretary of Labor (Kennelb If/
Star, Solicitor General,Departmentofjustice, Wasbington, DC 20530; telephone (202) 514-2217):
1. An agency's reasonable interpretations of ambiguous
provisions of a statute it is entrusted to administer are
entitled to deference because those interpretations are
-in integral part of the agency's authority to implement
statutory policy The Secretary's interpretations of the
Secretary's own regulations under the OSI I Act are entitled to deference, because the Secretary is charged
with policymaking and enforcement authority, while
the Commission is purely an adjudicatory agency.
2. Tihe legislative history confirms that the Secretary is the
policymaker under the OSI I Act and that the Secretary's
interpretations of the Secretary's own regulations are
therefore entitled to deference.
3. Principles established in analogous contexts support the
view that deference is owed to the policymaking entity (the Secretary), rather than the adjudicatory entity
(the Commission).
For CF&I Steel Corporation (Counsel of Record, Randy
L. Sego, 8400 E. Prentice At'e., STE 1040, Englewood, CO
80111; telepbone (303) 740-0846):
I. In those instances under the OSII Act when the Secretary's interpretation of a regulatory standard is clearly
wrong or when the regulatory standard is genuinely
ambiguous, deference should be accorded to the Commission's reasonable interpretation. The Commission's
function as an adjudicator of contested citations necessarily includes the power to declare the law by interpreting regulations, and this power is necessary and
important to preserve the notice and clue process rights
of employers.
2. The Commission's ability to interpret regulations is consistent with congressional intent and does not infringe
upon the Secretary's rulemaking and policymaking
functions under the OSII Act.
3. Because the facts and circumstances of this case demonstrate that the Secretary's interpretation of the regula1fl

tory standards was unreasonable and inconsistent with
the plain language of the standards, tile Tenth Circuit
properly deferred to the reasonable construction of the
standards by the Commission.
4. In order to preserve tile integrity and function of the
Commission, a reviewing court should be allowed to
scrutinize both the Secretary's interpretation and the
Commission's interpretation of a regulatory standard,
and deference should be afforded to tile most reasonable interpretation of both the Commission and the
Secretary as well as to the purpose and plain language
of the regulatory standards at issue.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of the U.S. Department of Labor
I. The AFL-CIO (Counsel of Record, Laurence Gold, 815
16th St., NW Washington, DC 20006; telephone (202)

63 7-5383).
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In Support of the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission atd CF&I Steel Corporation
I. The National Association of Manufacturers and the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (Counsel of Record, IV Scott Railton; Brooke Bashore-Smith, Reed
Smith Shat & AlcClay Ring Bldg., 1200 18th St., NW,
Washington, DC 20036; telephone (202) 457-6162).

2. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America; the Industry Council on the Environment,
Safety, and Ilealth; and the United States Ilispanic
Chamber of Commerce (Counsel of Record, Stephan
A. Bokat, National Chamber Litigation Center; Inc.,
1615 11 St., A' Washington, DC 20062; telephone
(202) 463-533 7).
3. The American Iron and Steel Institute (Counsel of Record, Albert J. Beveridge, II; Beveridge & Diamond,
PC.. 1350 1St., NW, STE 700, Washington, DC20005;
telephone (202) 789-6000.
4. The Occupational Safety and I lealth Review Commission (Counsel of Record, Robert C. Gonbar; Jones,
Day Reat is & Pogue, 1450 G St., NW Watshington. DC
20005-5701; telephone (202) 879-3939).
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